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THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENT TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
BY HUNTINGTON WILSON,
Formerly Assistant Secretary of State.
The relation of government to foreign investment by its citi-
zens is one of correlative obligation and authority, general obliga-
tion to protect the citizens’ rights, and authority to control the
citizens’ course by giving great or little protection, or none at all.
In the discharge of its obligation the duty of government is to
measure the protection to be given any investment first of all by
the advantage of that investment to the nation; and secondarily to
mete out that protection in proportion to the right of the investor
to expect protection.
The authority correlated with the obligation to protect is that
involved in the power to vary, in accordance with the criteria above
cited, the degree of protection, if any, to be afforded in the case of
a given investment. Without any legislation on the subject, the
government’s authority is automatically of determinative poten-
tiality in this question of foreign investment in all countries except
those of the highest credit and stability. And even in the case of
such countries, an adverse intimation from Washington would tend
to have a blighting moral effect upon a proposed investment of
American capital.
From the days of the struggles of Phoenicians, Carthaginians,
Greeks and Romans in the Mediterranean down to today, it has been
power, and above all sea power, which alone has protected foreign
trade. Even in these allegedly softer times, we must admit, now at
least, that it is only under the shadow of the great powers, those
prepared or potentially able to use great power, that small countries
like Belgium, or even relatively weak, although great, countries can,
as independent nations, carry on a big foreign trade. The govern-
mental relation to foreign investment in its authority and obliga-
tions presupposes and demands power.
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THE RELATION OF THE GOVERNMENT TO FOREIGN ENTERPRISE
For the purposes of this discussion, we shall do well to consider
the relation of government to foreign trade and to all sorts of foreign
enterprises, as well as to investment in the narrower sense of shares
and bonds, because the same principles apply to all alike. It may
at first sight seem an extreme view, but one may go farther and
apply similar general principles even to the relation of government
to the presence of its citizens to reside for any purpose in any part
of the world.
The relation we are considering is one to be dealt with by the
diplomatic department. Like other questions of real and statesman-
like diplomacy, this question derives its importance and its charm
and interest from its farspread ramifications and concatenations.
It carries into the far future and it brings many sciences out of the
&dquo;conference stage&dquo; to an entirely practical application in every day
international business. Here, as elsewhere, diplomacy becomes
everything that concerns one’s country, fostered through its foreign
relations.
During the four, years preceding the present administration,
when Mr. Knox, as Secretary of State, gave a new definiteness,
intelligibility and ’practicalness to American diplomacy, the policy
toward foreign investment was epitomized thus: &dquo;The Depart-
ment (of State) will give all proper support to legitimate and bene-
ficial American enterprises in foreign countries.&dquo; This formula was
the invariable answer to the prudent investor desiring to know in
advance what would be done for him if, through no fault of his own,
he got into trouble, due, say, to oppression or failure to protect on
the part of some foreign government.
Now the government’s obligation to protect a particular Ameri-
can interest abroad must, in its discharge, be measured and meted
out, as has been said, in proportion to the benefit of that particular
interest to the nation as a whole. Whatever influence or force the
government may exert in the world is the prestige and power of the
nation. Consider this collective power, moral or physical, as a
great reservoir. The executive branch of our government has con-
stitutional authority to conduct foreign relations untramelled except
by the authority of the Senate when it comes to a treaty, by the
authority of the whole Congress when it comes to an appropriation
of money, and in some few other respects. This authority is so
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appallingly broad, one may remark, that it becomes of vital neces-
sity that the United States should have fundamentals of foreign
policy that are accepted by the whole nation, to be permanent
bases of action in all specific questions of importance. Otherwise
the American people can be involved by the executive without
referendum in any folly during every four years between presidential
elections. Even party platforms about foreseen questions are no
safeguard, for we see them violated, as in the Panama Canal tolls
question with Great Britain. Now this startling breadth of execu-
tive authority in diplomacy places the executive, as trustee of the
nation’s international influence, under obligations of the greatest
solemnity and weight. Therefore how much thought must the
Secretary of State take before turning the tap of the reservoir and
drawing off for the protection of a foreign enterprise a measure of
the national prestige and power entrusted by the people to his care! t
&dquo;DOLLAR DIPLOMACY&dquo;
This theme and its illustration by example lead to an exposi-
tion of what has been called &dquo;Dollar Diplomacy.&dquo; It might better
be described as common sense diplomacy, in contradistinction from
the diplomacy of perfunctoriness or that of whimsical sentimentality
from which the United States has suffered so much. It is submitted,
moreover, that one who will carefully study the so-called &dquo;Dollar
Diplomacy&dquo; will be fully convinced that it was a diplomacy of
common sense in the highest sense of that term, that is, a diplomacy
determined by the application of scientific principles and sound
thinking to plain facts studied and understood as they really are;
a diplomacy preferring to build for the long future, rather than to
dogmatize for the moment’s expediency; preferring the truth to a
beautiful idealization not resting upon truth.
Now the national advantage of a foreign investment may con-
sist in (1) political advantage or (2) economic advantage. Service
to humanity is not mentioned separately because charity begins at
home; because it is America’s first duty to serve America; because
America, as a government, can amply serve humanity in spheres
and in ways in which America also serves itself; and because if it
does that, the service to humanity may be considered by diplomacy,
which is not, by the way, an eleemosynary institution, as merged in
the service of America, that is, in American political advantage,
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Those who dissent from this view and yield to our national foible
for grandiloquent sentimentality ought to reflect that a trustee,
however admirable his private charities, would be put in jail if he
used trust funds for benefactions; and that exactly so the American
executive defrauds the nation if he uses its prestige and power in a
diplomacy directed by sentimentality to the service of humanity in
general, instead of a diplomacy seeking the political and economic
advantage of the American taxpayer, the American nation.
POLITICAL ADVANTAGES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Political advantage (1), then, comprises such factors as (a)
strengthening American influence in spheres where it ought to pre-
dominate over any other foreign influence on account of reasons of
fundamental policy, like the Monroe Doctrine, or of military
strategy or of neighborhood. Such a sphere is &dquo;Latin America,&dquo;
where our interest increases in intensity from a vanishing minimum
at Cape Horn northward to reach its maximum in the zone of the
Caribbean Sea, the neighborhood of the Panama Canal, and in
Mexico. In this category falls also, for example, the discharge of
our historic obligation to Liberia and the preservation of that little
country as a pied-d-terre in Africa, of possible potential value to us
for commerce or for the emigration of African Americans. Such
political advantage ranks highest. Next comes (b) the maintenance
of a traditional position favorable to our trade where trade may go
by political favor, as in the Chinese Empire. Other cases of political
advantage would be (c) the strengthening of our friendship with
other great powers, or (d) with countries where it is wise to pre6mpt
a share in a dawning development, like Turkey, or (e) with coun-
tries whose markets are especially valuable. The cases merge so
gradually into one another as to make clear cut classification di~-
cult. This is true also of the division of political from economic
advantage. The idea is that in some cases trade is important
primarily for its political effects through mutual interest and asso-
ciation, while in others a good political relation is valued (if not
for safety and advantage in actual co6peration or alliance) for its
tendency to favor trade. The student of American diplomacy will
readily enough place our relations with different countries in appro-
priate categories even without an attempt at nicer classification
than is here intimated.
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THE ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES
Inasmuch as political advantage comprises whatever touches
national security, the first place in importance, among economic
advantages, must be given to (a) those investments or enterprises
which most promote vital political interest. Next most important
in economic advantage to the nation and usually identical with (a)
are (b) foreign investments or enterprises which establish perma-
nent and valuable markets for trade while at the same time sub-
serving political strength where the policy of this country demands
that it be strong if we are to have security and tranquility. Other
cases are (c) investments or enterprises which have these same
purely material advantages while carrying with them some political
advantage as well, as, for example, in safeguarding our Chinese
trade; or (d) those investments or enterprises which serve in giving us
a commercial standing in some valuable market where development
may be pre8mpted by others if a footing be not early obtained (like
Turkey); or (e) in cementing friendship with our natural allies, as
Canada and the English speaking peoples generally; or (f) in bring-
ing profit and employment to the American people in general.
In the encouragement of foreign enterprise, diplomacy must
beware of forcing it into spheres where vexations conflict with the
special spheres of influence and interest of other countries outweighs
all commercial gain to be looked for. Every great power has some
&dquo;doctrines&dquo; that it conceives to be as vital to it as the Monroe
Doctrine is considered here. Korea and Manchuria, Persia and
Siam, come to mind as examples of territory where, while conduct-
ing ordinary trade, we should be wasting our energies to attempt
intensive developments. In return we should gradually crowd out
from our own sphere of special interest foreign interests wherever
they are predominant to an uncomfortable, extent and quite beyond
the requirements of an ordinary trade outside the spheres of special
interest of the foreign governments concerned.
Quite aside from this common sense circumscribing of our
spheres of greatest effort to make them comport with the facts of
world politics, it is still true that there is not enough American
capital yet available for foreign investment thoroughly to cover the
duty of consolidating our economic position in the spheres where
that necessity is most obvious. Also, there is a lack of men trained
for this work and willing to reside under tropical rain; amidst moun-
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tain peaks, on broad savannas, and in ancient cities of manners and
ideas quite alien to our own, in order to carry it on. &dquo; God gives a
man his relatives; he chooses his friends.&dquo; A nation is less fortu-
nate. The hazards of history have made us a sphere of vital inter-
est which we have to cultivate, however difficult it be.
PROPER SUPPORT TO LEGITIMATE ENTERPRISES
Let us return to the formula. &dquo;The Department (of State)
will give all proper support to legitimate and beneficial American
enterprises in foreign countries.&dquo; A legitimate enterprise must be
honest and fair, and just to the foreigners concerned. But it may
be legitimate so far as the interested American is concerned and
beneficial to him individually while not beneficial to the nation.
Such would be the case if the dangers of seriously involving this
country in fresh obligations outweighed any national advantage; if
the investment diverted from channels of real national advantage
money that might otherwise serve that advantage either abroad or
at home; or if the project involved offending a valued friend among
the nations. To merit the strongest governmental support, the
foreign investment or enterprise must be really beneficial to the
nation.
In the formula, the phrase &dquo;all proper support&dquo; is advisedly
indefinite. The Secretary of State must reserve the question of how
much support will be &dquo;proper&dquo; in a given case, because when the
question is asked it is a hypothetical one; because the question will
be a political question, to be affected, perhaps, by changing condi-
tions ; and because, above all, it will be one involving the careful
consideration of subtle measures of national advantage,-which is
the first measure, as the citizens’ right is the second measure, of
the government’s support. The government’s obligation is its duty
to the citizen, but the coefficient of that duty is its duty to the
nation.
Proper support is the discharge of the government’s obligation,
limited by its variant authority or power, expressed in terms of
action, diplomatic, or in the last resort, warlike. And that proper
support is the duty to the citizen plus or minus the sum of political
and economic national advantage.
This almost mathematical expression of the theory of &dquo;Dollar
Diplomacy,&dquo; to use the approbrious nickname, may assist a clear
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understanding of a subject deplorably little considered by our
countrymen. Illustration, however, will perhaps supply vividness
to a dry statement.
APPLYING &dquo;DOLLAR DIPLOMACY&dquo;
Without law, it is of course only where the citizen thinks he
may ultimately need his government’s help to &dquo;pull his chestnuts
out of the fire&dquo; that he can really be controlled. He will buy Anglo-
French bonds in full faith in the honor and stability of Great Britain
and France. If he jumped into a pet private preserve of Great
Britain or France and engaged in enterprises subversive of some
policy of &dquo;protection, guidance and control&dquo; (to quote the classic
of Japanese aggression in Korea), it is not intended to imply that
his government would abandon him to his fate. It would seek
equitable damages for him, but probably not specific performance.
So it was, in principle, to give an analogous example, when the
American advisers were forced out of Persia by Russia and England.
American influence in Persia was of no account to our national
interest. An equitable adjustment doing justice in a general way
to our citizens, would in such a case be proper policy. If, on the
other hand, those advisers had been in a country where American
influence was of national importance, the American government
must have resisted their dismissal and insisted upon specific per-
formance, although the contracts were no more binding in the one
case than in the other.
The convention with Santo Domingo, the agreement with Cuba
involving certain public works, the convention of 1911 with Hon-
duras (rendered abortive by the vote of an adverse party majority
in the Senate), the old arrangement and convention with Nicaragua,
carried out after a fashion by the present administration, the loan
policy with China, which the present administration promptly
killed and now has made an unsuccessful effort to resuscitate,-all
these involved foreign investments of such great and unquestion-
able national advantage that the government was an active partici-
pant in them; and, by urging on the investors to lend themselves
as instrumentalities of foreign policy, the government clothed those
investors with rights to protection of especial dignity.
Since this is not a discussion of American diplomacy at large,
but is confined, so far as practicable, to one phase of that subject,
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those transactions need not be described at length. Suffice it to
say that the object of the Central American policy was &dquo;to substi-
tute dollars for bullets,&dquo; to create a material prosperity which
should wean the Central Americans from their usual preoccupation
of revolution. Those countries have great natural wealth. Lack
of capital, lack of skill, and still more the absence of any guarantee
against confiscation and destruction due to the frequent revolutions
when law and order are thrown overboard, prevent the development
of their natural wealth by the people themselves. The same condi-
tions throttle their export trade and destroy their purchasing power.
Attacks upon American interests, and even upon the personal safety
of American planters and others engaged in those countries, call for
our government’s protection. The similar jeopardy of European
interests demands, as an unavoidable corollary of the Monroe
Doctrine, the protection of the American government. For the
frequent interventions, moral or physical, thus necessitated, we had
no convenient base. With great pertinacity certain far away Euro-
pean powers, with an effrontery engendered by the inchoate state
of American foreign policy, have been at great pains to poach upon
our preserves in the Caribbean and even on the Isthmus itself. In
Central America, as in Cblumbia in theory, there was the question
of an alternative inter-oceanic canal route, and that was a basis in-
conveniently open for the pre8mption of a special interest which we
could not afford to see go to others than ourselves. Trade with
Central America was retarded by the lack of railways and by
financial instability. The ports of our southern states, the logical
centers of this rich trade, were being deprived by those adverse
conditions of a profit due them from the facts of geography. It is
true that one or two of the republics of Central America are in far
better condition than the others. To cite a case where the political
and economic advantages are both of the first rank and where, there-
fore, the measure of governmental support should be at its highest,
I will refer to the policy toward Nicaragua, which illustrates only
more completely what should be the spirit of our policy throughout
the zone of the Caribbean. Indeed as now implemented our policy
in effect is the same in principle in Panama, Cuba, Santo Domingo
and Haiti.
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OUR POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA
In Nicaragua a New York bank of the highest standing was
induced to invest in the financial rehabilitation of the country, its
transactions giving it an interest in the railways and in the customs
revenues, which it is always desirable to remove from the reach of
revolutionary depredations. Americans were engaged as financial
advisers, as claims commissioners and in other important capacities.
A convention was signed to give the United States a naval station
in the Gulf of Fonseca, dominating three of the republics. A per-
petual option upon the Nicaraguan canal route was assured us. A
large sum of money was to be advanced Nicaragua for its most
pressing needs, but to be expended only under American supervi-
sion. The full fruition of this plan was postponed by partisan
opposition in the Senate, but it was later taken over, in a general
way, by the present administration and may now, it is hoped, meet
a kinder fate. An outstanding feature of this particular policy is its
effort to help our neighbors to help themselves and to do so in prac-
tical ways, which advance at the same time the very real and quite
legitimate and indeed the inevitable interests of our own country.
The Nicaraguan arrangements are so comprehensive that they
serve to illustrate many phases of the same policy we have seen
pursued in Cuba, in Panama, in Haiti, in Honduras. The public
revenues, especially the customs dues, must be placed out of reach
of the revolutionary robber or the dictator. Capital must be brought
in to establish peaceful husbandry and unmolested industry. Edu-
cation and civilization must bring justice. A guiding hand must
prevent foreign entanglements, which, under the Monroe Doctrine,
straightway involve us. Even if the Monroe Doctrine had never
been announced, common prudence would today force upon us the
same policy from our southern border throughout the zone of the
Caribbean.
THE LAW OF NATIONAL SURVIVAL
No far seeing policy, but a natural human movement, accounts
for the vast American investment in Mexico and for the penetration
of thousands and thousands of Americans into Mexican territory as
planters and miners and workers. Here a natural law and a political
theory work together, as is the case whenever the political theory
is sound. There are so many analogies between biology and inter-
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national evolution that one may invoke a sort of &dquo;international
biology.&dquo; The march of civilization brooks no violation of the law
of the survival of the fittest. Neighboring countries comprise an
environment. The strongest will dominate that environment. Sen-
timental phrases about the sovereignty of weaker countries will no
more permit them to run amuck with impunity than ranting about
individual rights will permit an outrageous citizen to annoy a
municipality and escape the police. The biological law of the ten-
dency to revert to the lower type as the higher attributes are dis-
used is at work among nations; and nature, in its rough method of
uplift, gives sick nations strong neighbors and takes its inexorable
course with private enterprise and diplomacy as its instruments.
And this course is the best in the long run, for all concerned and for
the world. The murder of two or three German missionaries in
far-off China, cost China Kaichow and practically a province. The
murder of many Americans in nearby Mexico, where by every law
of neighborhood and policy they had a special right to be and to be
protected, has cost Mexico so far-the reading of a great many
communications. Life is priceless; but what of the investors, great
and small? Here is a case where political and economic advantage
to the nation are at a high level, where the government’s obligation
to protect connotes a great degree of support as proper. This is so
because no field of investment is more natural than that over the
border, which fact gives the citizen the right to expect support,
subject to the national interest concerned, in this case a high co-
efficient. If so much be granted, the support, it has been said, is
limited by its (the government’s) variant authority or power.
Since no one doubts its power, our government’s task then becomes
one of ways and means, with the evident duty of sparing so far as
possible our own blood and treasure. The seizing and holding of
revenues amply to cover all actual damages at once suggests itself
as a practical measure and one readily assimilable with the chastise-
ment and chastening due from us if we do not repudiate the duties
imposed upon us in the nature of things by laws as real as those of
biology.
This digression is perhaps excusable as anticipating the ques-
tion of ways and means of protecting foreign investments and enter-
prises in various cases which differ as widely as the one just described
differs from an economic question with a first-rate power. There,
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too, we bungle and are unprepared. We lack the weapon of a slid-
ing-scale tariff, with discretion in the Executive to force justice to
our interests by the threat of effective and prompt retaliation.
THE SIX-POWER LOAN POLICY IN CHINA
The six-power loan policy in China is in point upon this ques-
tion of how the government would protect its citizens’ investments.
Aside from the high repute of the Chinese people for commercial
morality, what with the turbulent conditions of the Empire and its
distance from us (except in the Philippines) one might say that the
American government could ill afford to undertake to protect its
citizens in great investments there. In China we have a traditional
position of friendly concern and a commerce that once promised
very well. But we have not the political mandate of a cardinal
principle of policy nor the natural mandate of neighborhood as we
have in Mexico.
Mr. Knox &dquo; pooled &dquo; our interests in vast railway constructions
and currency reform, involving huge investments of capital, with
the interests of five other great powers. In this way, America
secured its share in those lucrative undertakings while its share
of responsibility in protection was only one-sixth of what it other-
wise would have been.
Let us further examine that Chinese policy which the present
administration in a heat of partisanship so ruthlessly reversed, to
learn later, as it did in respect to a number of other matters, that
foreign policy is not domestic politics. We may be our &dquo;brother’s
keeper&dquo; in the case of Mexico. We are certainly not China’s
keeper. I do not therefore attach to the purely political aspects of
our Chinese policy quite the same importance that some do. There
is working in the Far East an &dquo;international biology&dquo; that we have
neither duty nor interest in radically interfering with. Times have
changed since Mr. Hay expressed in idealizations about the &dquo;integ-
rity&dquo; of China the good will America had always felt for that Em-
pire. However, we wanted and we still want the &dquo;open door&dquo; of
ordinary equality of commercial opportunity. Before showing how
Mr. Knox’s policy served those practical ends, the political aspect
may be touched on, although it is rather one of sentiment than one
related to a policy of the first class that a nation would fight alone
for.
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Naturally enough, Russia and Japan have designs upon out-
lying Chinese territory and certain Chinese provinces. Manifestly,
to concatenate great interests of theirs with great interests of four
other powers preferring to preserve China pretty well intact would
tend to create a community of interest in the preservation of China’s
integrity. If two men with certain intentions were chained to four
men with other intentions, the course of the group would differ from
the untramelled progress of the first two men. Thus, without any
offensive or radical interference with other nations’ natural expan-
sion, the United States, with Great Britain, France and Germany
would have had a share in the first practical arrangement ever sug-
gested to work with any effect along the lines of the rather illusory
declarations of Mr. Hay.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE KNOX POLICY TOWARD CHINA
Turning from this now more or less chimerical consideration,
we note the really brilliant statesmanship of Mr. Knox in placing
us, with no danger and with only a small share of responsibility,
and that divided with powerful partners, in a position not only of
dignified equality, but of actual leadership in the large concerns of
the Chinese Empire! To realize how important that r61e was to
our general Chinese trade one must know China. Besides indirect
effects, the Chinese arrangement gave us such economic national
advantages as these: American engineers would be appointed and
American railway materials would be used on our proportional part
of the whole railway system. That meant money to American
industry. As to the bankers’ profits in the loans and the ultimate
bondholders’ income, they were good for the country too, economi-
cally, but were so clearly a means to a greater end that the bankers
had to be urged into the whole transaction and, during its difficult
course, often urged to remain interested. If this had not been done,
and if American bankers had not responded with a good deal of
patriotism, the biggest transactions ever undertaken in China would
have proceeded without the least participation by the country
which had officially talked most of China’s opportunities.
Reference to the direct economic advantages to the nation to
be found in the railway loans to China brings us to a few last com-
ments upon the measures of economic advantage in foreign invest-
rents. Lately a gentleman prominent among those who are at
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last making a campaign for foreign trade spoke of Russia as a great
field for American enterprise and in doing so spoke particularly
of the opportunities for branch factories. Now this question of
&dquo;extraterritorial enterprise&dquo; is a familiar one to the practical
diplomatist. A branch factory in a foreign country may be very
profitable to the capitalist, and it will be better than nothing in so
far as it brings money into the United States; but it does not directly
pay American wages or enrich and build up American communities,
as do great foreign orders to be executed in American factories at
home. Therefore the foreign branch factory is of relatively slight
national advantage and has relatively small claim on the benevolent
interest of the government. Such, by the way, would not be the
case of an American factory established where it was especially
desired to strengthen the national influence, particularly if the
factory was not in point-blank competition with a home factory
and in that way deflecting wages from Americans to cheaper foreign
labor on the spot.
THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD GUIDE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
The necessity of having our exports paid for ultimately in goods
or securities (and not always in gold) makes it of interest to the
government to encourage investment in certain countries. We
cannot, for example, buy the coffee crop of all Latin America.
Indeed to encourage here, to deter there, in siiort, more or less to
guide foreign investment, is a proper function of government.
There should not be obligation without authority. The value of our
home investments rests, in the last resort, upon our municipal law.
The value of our foreign investments rests, in the last resort, upon
our diplomacy, the conduct of our foreign policy. The efficacy of
these depends upon our prestige and our military power, and these
last are the possession of the nation.
There would thus be a logic in a requirement of official permis-
sion to list foreign securities in our markets or to undertake certain
foreign enterprises. For the exercise of this discretion we should
need a little law. It might be vested in a small committee, for
example, of competent officials of the Department of State, of the
Treasury and Federal Reserve Board, with the Chairmen of the
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs committees of Congress.
It seems, after the question has been mooted for years, that
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we still need a law (perhaps!) to keep the Sherman Anti-Trust law
from frightening our manufacturers and merchants out of their
right to combine to compete with Europe in foreign commerce.
Only now have our laws a little helped our bankers to establish
themselves abroad and to give our trade and enterprise the needed
facilities. We are very backward in foreign affairs, commercial,
financial, and political, and disposed to neglect all that hard ground
that lies between great visions and small details. The end of the
war will leave with the problems of foreign investment and enter-
prise and the government’s relation thereto a new urgency. And
laws or no laws, if we are to deal wisely with them, the realities of
American diplomacy must become matters of conscious concern
and intelligent interest to American citizens. Only so can govern-
ment be compelled, under our system, to perform its task of leader-
ship, to make effective its proper relation to foreign investment and
enterprise.
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